

Market Design Approaches to Inequality

Scott Duke Kominers

Pre-Reading/Introduction.

- Alvin E. Roth. The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics. *Econometrica*, 70:1341–1378, 2002.
- Parag A. Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez. Leveling the playing field: Sincere and sophisticated players in the Boston mechanism. *American Economic Review*, 98:1636–1652, 2008.

Discussed in Lecture.

- Parag A. Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez. School admissions reform in Chicago and England: Comparing mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. *American Economic Review*, 103:80–106, 2013.
- Yan Chen and Onur Kesten. From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms. Tepper Business School Working Paper, 2013.
- John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima, and Yusuke Narita. Promoting school competition through school choice: A market design approach. Stanford Graduate School of Business Working Paper, 2012.
- Caterina Calsamiglia and Antonio Miralles. All about priorities: No school choice under the presence of bad schools. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Working Paper, 2012.
- Fuhito Kojima. School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 75:685–693, 2012.
- Isa Emin Hafalir, M. Bumin Yenmez, and Muhammed Ali Yildirim. Effective affirmative action in school choice. *Theoretical Economics*, 8:325–363, 2013.
- Scott Duke Kominers and Tayfun Sönmez. Designing for diversity in matching. University of Chicago Working Paper, 2013.
- Tayfun Sönmez. Bidding for army career specialties: Improving the ROTC branching mechanism. *Journal of Political Economy*, 121:186–219, 2013.
- Scott Duke Kominers and E. Glen Weyl. Holdout in the assembly of complements: A problem for market design. *American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings*, 102:360–365, 2012.

Further Reading

Survey.

- Alvin E. Roth. The art of designing markets. *Harvard Business Review*, 85, 2007.
- Alvin E. Roth. Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open questions. *International Journal of Game Theory*, 36:537–569, 2008.

Matching Theory.

- David Gale and Lloyd S. Shapley. College admissions and the stability of marriage. *American Mathematical Monthly*, 69:9–15, 1962.
- L. E. Dubins and D. A. Freedman. Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm. *American Mathematical Monthly*, 88:485–494, 1981.
- Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor. *Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis*. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- John William Hatfield and Paul Milgrom. Matching with contracts. *American Economic Review*, 95:913–935, 2005.
- Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver. Matching, allocation, and exchange of discrete resources. *Handbook of Social Economics*, 1:781–852, 2009.

School Choice.

- Michel Balinski and Tayfun Sönmez. A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 84:73–94, 1999.
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez. School choice: A mechanism design approach. *American Economic Review*, 93:729–747, 2003.
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. The New York City high school match. *American Economic Review*, 95:364–367, 2005.
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sönmez. The Boston public school match. *American Economic Review*, 95:368–371, 2005.
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sönmez. Changing the Boston school choice mechanism: Strategy-proofness as equal access. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Working Paper, 2006.
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. Strategyproofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match. *American Economic Review*, 99(5):1954–1978, 2009.
- Onur Kesten. School choice with consent. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125:1297–1348, 2010.
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda. Resolving conflicting preferences in school choice: The Boston mechanism reconsidered. *American Economic Review*, 101:399–410, 2011.
- Surendrakumar Bagde, Dennis Epple, and Lowell J. Taylor. Dismantling the legacy of caste: Affirmative action in Indian higher education. Tepper Business School Working Paper, 2011.
- Lars Ehlers, Isa E. Hafalir, M. Bumin Yenmez, and Muhammed A. Yildirim. School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds. Tepper Business School Working Paper, 2011.
- Parag A. Pathak. The mechanism design approach to student assignment. *Annual Review of Economics*, 3:513–536, 2011.
- Federico Echenique and M. Bumin Yenmez. How to control controlled school choice. Tepper Business School Working Paper, 2013.
- Umut Dur, Scott Duke Kominers, Parag A. Pathak, and Tayfun Sönmez. The demise of walk zones in Boston: Priorities vs. precedence in school choice. Boston College Working Paper, 2013.

Cadet–Branch Matching.

Tayfun Sönmez and Tobias B. Switzer. Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at United States Military Academy. *Econometrica*, 81:451–488, 2013.

Combinatorial Assignment.

Eric Budish. The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. *Journal of Political Economy*, 119:1061–1103, 2011.

Eric Budish and Estelle Cantillon. The multi-unit assignment problem: Theory and evidence from course allocation at harvard. *American Economic Review*, 102:2237–2271, 2012.

Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che, Fuhito Kojima, and Paul Milgrom. Designing random allocation mechanisms: Theory and applications. *American Economic Review*, 103:585–623, 2013.

Eminent Domain.

Scott Duke Kominers and E. Glen Weyl. Concordance among holdouts. Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper, 2012.